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ABSTRACT 
Movie theaters in the U.S. may have recently ended a period of  crisis but this paper argues that 
major problems are not over for the industry.  Most movie theaters in the multiplex era have adopted 
a remarkably similar strategy which is also very vulnerable to recent trends such as the explosion of 
home cinema, pay TV, VOD, discounting by mass merchandisers of DVDs, computer games and the 
collapse of video windows.   Just as technological convergence has created a challenge for movie 
theatres, as it has in the past, so can new technologies and creative use of assets combined with 
multiple target marketing offer a counter measure for at least some movie theatres – until the next 
challenge.  What is unlikely to succeed is more of the same, especially when so many multiplex 
chains offer the same format as others, appear to adopt a narrow definition of what business they are 
in and manifest a one size should fit all approach to customers. The industry has employed 
differentiation and niche marketing much less than other industries.  The very diversity of strategies 
needed means that all cannot be explored in this paper which will focus on two new technologies 
from the IMAX corporation, DMX and MPX, as an example of how a theatre operator might counter 
audience declines.   
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1. The impact of new technologies on movie attendance 
Innovation is fundamental to continued business survival (Schumpeter, 1975). A 
sustainable competitive advantage facilitates long term firm profitability (Aaker, 
1998), but relies upon ongoing environmental consonance and the position of 
defendability that is achieved if the advantage provides value that cannot be copied, 
substituted, or eroded by competitors ([Barney, 1991] and [Porter, 1980]). Now a 
century old, the cinema has historically enjoyed a competitive advantage over other 
forms of entertainment, as built upon two foundations which are currently being 
undermined. During the movie industry’s first century, movie theaters represented the 
first-release retail market for the American film industry. Until movies were first 
broadcast on television in the late 1950s, and later became available on video, they 
could only be seen in a movie theater. Moreover, until the recent introduction of 
alternative digital delivery technologies and big screen televisions, the primary 
medium for watching movies on large, wide screens has also been in movie theaters.  
American movie theater attendance has, in the past, been impacted by the emergence 
of competition from product substitutes created by technological innovation. During 
the Great Depression, commercial radio provided Americans with free home 
entertainment. As a result, annual theater admissions declined from 1930 to 1936, 
with Fox Film President, William Fox, attributing the deleterious effect to the 
influence of radio (Sinclair, 1933). Booming once again following World War II, the 
box office racked up an almost two-fold increase in annual attendance between 1937 
and 1946. Then, during the 1950s, American families migrated to the newly 
developing suburbs in search of cheap housing, an exodus which coincided with the 
widespread diffusion of television into American homes (Sklar, 1978). Annual movie 
attendance declined steeply as the weekly cinema-going audience began staying home 
to watch TV (Puttnam, 1998). The impact of this cultural and technological 
phenomenon was highlighted by a 1951 New York Times survey across 100 cities 
hosting television stations: movie attendance had declined between 20% and 40% in 
those locations (Gould, 1951). As summarized by Sklar (1978, p. 272), “By 1953, 
when 46% of American families were estimated to own television sets, motion picture 
attendance had dropped to almost exactly half of the 1946 high water mark.”  
Fig. 1 plots annual US movie admissions from 1920 to 2005 and illustrates that the 
introduction of new competing technologies (radio and TV) broadly corresponds to 
declining movie theater attendance over time. It also indicates that the mass movie-
going audience fragmented after World War II as more product substitutes (black and 
white TV, color TV, Pay TV, home video, PCs) emerged over time to provide 
alternative entertainment options.  
 
Fig. 2 compares the decline in American movie theater attendance with the rising 
penetration of television into US households, during the focus period of 1950–1978. 
In sum, it illustrates the impact that television had as a product substitute (Stuart, 
1976). 
 
 
 
Owing to the relatively recent, dynamic growth of the home video market, current 
release windows between movie theaters and videos have been shrinking. As such, 
movie theaters are facing an uncertain future, one in which they might well no longer 
hold the firm competitive advantage that they’ve historically enjoyed.  
This article considers how the US movie theater industry, in light of direct threats 
from new technologies, can re-establish a sustainable competitive advantage today. In 
addition, it identifies some innovations that may be relevant toward that end.  
2. The new economics of the movie business 
The economics of the movie business have changed fundamentally since the Studio 
Era, when Hollywood film company giants not only made pictures, but owned theater 
chains in which to show their product. Prior to the US Supreme Court’s 1948 anti-
trust ruling, which forced the selling of these outlets, the theatrical release of a film 
accounted for 100% of its revenues; there were no post-theatrical markets and the 
book value of a movie at the end of its theatrical life was only one dollar (Puttnam, 
1998). In stark contrast, the release of movies in theaters today may only account for 
30% of total revenues, with 40% derived from video sales and 30% from television 
markets (Vogel, 2004). Since the 1970s, new media delivery channels such as home 
video, cable TV, satellite TV, pay-per-view, DVD players, and video-on-demand 
have enabled consumers to watch movies in places other than a movie theater.  
In today’s competitive and fractured entertainment environment, the major studios 
now use a film’s theatrical release to establish its brand (Duncan, 1998). This enables 
exploitation of larger profits down the value chain, in home video and television 
markets, and from other ancillary revenue streams such as licensed merchandising, 
music soundtracks, and book tie-ins (Epstein, 2005). No longer do major studio-
distributors focus solely on the box office, as they once did during the Studio Era. 
Instead, the Majors are now in the entertainment business, distributing movies and 
other screen offerings across a range of delivery channels, while individual movie 
theaters remain trained on motion picture exhibition. At the dawning of the film 
industry’s second century, movie theaters face increasingly intense competition, not 
only from product substitutes (e.g., pay TV, DVDs, large screen LCD and plasma 
televisions, video-on-demand, multi-media enabled G3 cell phones, video iPods, 
portable digital media centers) but also from other diversionary forms of 
entertainment and leisure that compete directly for the attention of movie theaters’ 
primary target segment: audience members aged 12–24 years old (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1.  
Changing demographics of US cinema audiences  
 12–24 years (%) 25–39 (%) 40–59 (%) > 60 years (%)
1975 60 26 11 3 
1990 43 33 17 7 
2005a 38 28 25 10 
Sources: (International Motion Picture Almanac, 1978), (MPA, 2005) and (MPA, 
2006). 
a Note: The 2005 demographics listed in this table were calculated from data spread 
across eight age groups. Because numbers in the MPA survey were originally 
presented as featuring decimal places, as opposed to whole percentages, rounding up 
brought the total percentage for the year to 101%. This extra 1% is probably spread 
across 2–3 age groups, so it is not possible to identify which age category in this table 
should be reduced.  
3. The business problem for theater operators 
Causes of the recent drop in box office revenues and a decline in movie attendance 
became the focus of intense industry analysis and media scrutiny during 2005–2006. 
The debate raged, but speculation by industry insiders and media analysts tended to 
cluster around a number of possible explanations. Some of these hypotheses can be 
readily dismissed. First, many in the industry blamed a poor 2005 product lineup for 
the box office slump; according to this rationale, movies released during 2005 were 
simply not as good as those that premiered in 2004 ([Germain, 2005] and [Grove, 
2005]). The problem with this explanation is that it cannot fully account for a 
downward trend in theater attendance which began two years earlier, in 2003. John 
Fithian, President of NATO (North American Theater Owners), reassured theater 
operators that like all industries, the movie business is cyclical and bad years happen 
(Booth, 2005). Industry cycles do not, however, adequately explain the general 
downturn in theater attendance since 1948. The mass audience of the Studio Era was 
fragmented with the diffusion of television into American homes during the 1950s, 
and replaced by a narrower primary segment during the 1960s and 1970s.  
Within this time frame, the teenage/young adult segment (aged 12–24 years) became 
the core movie-goers upon which theaters relied (Green, 1970), and accounted for 
60% of all movie patrons in 1975 (International Motion Picture Almanac, 1978). In 
2005, this same segment remained the largest in terms of theater attendance, 
representing 38% of all movie-goers. In contrast, aging baby boomers (40–59 years) 
represent 25% and 25–39 year olds, 28% (MPA, 2005).  
There are, however, multiple explanations for recent movie attendance decline which 
are both reasonable and valid. In order to provide some structure to these 
explanations, we will consider them in terms of Porter’s (1980) five forces: 
substitutes, buyers, suppliers, barriers to entry, and rivalry.  
3.1. Substitutes 
The availability of product substitutes has been increasing, due to the diffusion of 
home cinema and other digital technologies that enable consumers to watch movies in 
forms other than on a theater screen. Some of the most recent and dramatic threats to 
movie theaters have arisen from the sudden emergence of the home cinema industry. 
Until the past few years, movie theaters were the only form of big screen 
entertainment. Since then, however, technology diffusion (including large screen 
televisions and home cinema projectors) has enabled potential movie patrons to get 
closer to the image by bringing the theater experience into their homes. According to 
a Harris Poll survey, one-third of Americans saw fewer movies in theaters in 2005 
than they did in 2004, with two-thirds of the respondents citing in-home entertainment 
such as DVD, video-on-demand, and HDTV as the cause (C. Cramer, personal 
communication, December 22, 2005). As reported at the time by Online Testing 
eXchange, “Males under 25 years old, a core movie audience, saw fewer films this 
past summer but watched more DVDs, played more video games, and surfed the Web 
more often than previously” (“Hollywood Movies,” 2005). 
Widespread availability of broadband and video-on-demand is likely to further 
compound this problem. Theater design of multiplexes and megaplexes may also have 
exacerbated the situation. The relative size of most multiplex screens, particularly the 
smaller auditoriums, may not be perceived by audiences as being too far removed 
from the in-home experience of watching the same movie on DVD on a large screen 
television (or home projector) featuring high-quality surround sound. Consequently, 
the value proposition offered by movie theaters is under serious assault from viable 
and increasingly affordable product substitutes.  
In 2005, theater chains were worried about the looming competitive threat posed by 
the compression of video release windows that edge increasingly closer to theatrical 
release dates (Sperling, 2005). Historically, theatrical release has been of paramount 
importance to the studios, as their financial models have based downstream ancillary 
market revenues on box office earnings. For example, Wal-Mart has determined the 
number of DVDs to order for a certain title based on that film’s theatrical success, and 
pay TV channels have paid advances to the studio based on cinematic performance 
(G. Foster, personal communication, December 7, 2005). However, New Line 
Marketing Vice President Gordon Paddison cited a recent J.P. Morgan Chase study 
which projects that a simultaneous day-and-date release of movies to cinemas and to 
DVD would increase studio revenues by 60%, but reduce movie theater revenues by 
50%. The Morgan study argued that the studios would also achieve greater marketing 
efficiencies with only one message required to market a movie across different media, 
as well as reduce the potential for video piracy (G. Paddison, personal 
communication, December 8, 2005). Taking a dim (and dire) view of this approach, 
NATO President John Fithian argues that “simultaneous release is a death threat for 
the movie (theater) industry” (Tourtellotte, 2005).  
3.2. Buyers 
Some industry experts blamed the 2005 box office slump on the total cost of going 
out to the movies. As any movie-goer can attest, most major movie theater chains use 
premium pricing for tickets and snack/refreshment concessions. According to Booth 
(2005), when the cost of tickets is combined with the additional costs of “popcorn, 
sodas, parking, and babysitters, a movie date can run $50, easy.” After suffering 
through such sticker shock, patrons often don’t enjoy that for which they’ve paid:  
“The multiplex experience of ringing cell phones, crying babies, loud talkers, sticky 
floors, and 20-minute-long commercial packages of advertisements means theater 
owners have had sufficient complaints that some are planning to hire more ushers to 
shush rude patrons.” (Booth, 2005) 
Later, we will illustrate that experiments with price elasticity of demand for some 
cinema tickets demonstrate cost, alone, is not necessarily a barrier. However, the 
combination of these factors means that the value proposition (based on both benefits 
and costs) of home cinema vs. movie theaters has changed dramatically for many 
buyers. This dynamic is reinforced by the social phenomenon known as ‘hiving,’ an 
emerging trend in a number of countries that has transformed several industries, such 
as entertainment and housing, in recent years. Hiving refers to social activities that 
bring people into contact with each other around a central home base. According to a 
Yankelovich survey, 64% of the participants identified themselves as ‘hivers’ (Cada, 
2003).  
We are spending more on entertainment, but social forces, as well as a technological 
revolution, mean we’re spending it at home. If an individual is time poor, he or she 
may be more reluctant to go out for entertainment. As proof of this, the average 
person now spends 50% more on DVDs than on cinema tickets. The explosion in 
DVD sales is also a reflection of new technology in plasma televisions and home 
theater equipment (which has dramatically improved in quality and price), as well as 
heavy discounting of DVDs by mass merchandisers, which use them as store traffic 
builders. Additionally, the computer game industry, with a global turnover of $20 
billion US, now competes against Hollywood for entertainment spending ([Evans, 
2004] and [Zion, 2004]).  
The cinema industry also needs to come to terms with changing audience 
demographics. Aging of the population is now widely recognized. People 50 and over 
control 75% of the net worth of US households, with individual income peaking 
between age 55 and 60. Despite this, there is evidence that marketers in many 
countries have difficulty understanding the needs of mature consumers, and even 
communicating with them (“Over 60,” 2002). Since the advent of television, the core 
market for Hollywood films showing at movie theaters has been young people, 
primarily teenagers. Recent evidence has shown, however, that this segment has been 
declining (see Table 1), and this should be a wake-up call to cinema operators that it 
may be time to challenge the dominant paradigm. Young people today have very 
different perceptions about entertainment, and value their mobile phones and Internet 
access over TV (Parson, 2006).  
3.3. Suppliers 
The major studios, as a collective of suppliers of high-quality movies, have great 
market power because they enjoy overwhelming channel dominance. Movie theaters, 
as buyers, are in a weak position due to the absence of a critical mass of commercially 
viable movies from other sources. The traditional formula for sharing revenue 
between movie theaters and studios has become increasingly unfair to theaters, as it 
favors distributors in the early weeks of a release. In the past, movies with a narrower 
release would more often run for long periods in theaters. Today, however, there 
exists a trend toward sharp audience declines, as studios now launch blockbusters 
with a wide release strategy and saturation television advertising. This has become a 
burden on cinemas, forcing them to achieve profitability through concession sales. In 
turn, this has increased the total cost of a trip to the cinema for consumers.  
3.4. Barriers to entry 
Barriers to entry are high in the US theater industry, unless the new player targets a 
niche market that has not been well served. Over the past decade, industry 
consolidation has alleviated the overbuilding of multiplex cinemas which occurred in 
the 1990s, but the barriers to entry on a large scale remain high.  
3.5. Rivalry 
Barriers to exit are high for theater chains because the design of multiplex cinemas 
does not lend itself easily to inexpensive conversion for other forms of business. This 
has resulted in intense rivalry within the US industry, and owners of theaters with 
screens that are often almost empty have unfortunately been slow to consider 
alternative uses.  
The American movie theater industry shifted from an initial low-cost theater model in 
the early nickelodeon era, to a quality strategy during the Studio Era that was based 
on differentiation. Under the latter system, classes of theaters existed, ranging from 
opulent movie palaces that ran first-run films on exclusive roadshow release at 
premium prices, down to fourth- and fifth-run theaters showing older releases at low 
prices. In the modern era, a further shift occurred to cost-efficient multiplexes. Too 
many theaters followed this strategy, however, ignoring differentiation and focus 
strategies. Today, the diffusion of enhancements to home cinema, such as high 
definition DVDs and affordable large screen televisions of 60 inches or more, means 
that the strategic convergence seen in the cinema industry is becoming even less 
visible.  
Two different schools of strategic thought are likely to offer a similar prescription for 
this industry. These are the strategic positioning school, illustrated by Porter (1980), 
and the resource-based view of the firm.  
4. Structural change and diminishing competitive advantage 
Some of the previously mentioned threats represent structural changes in the industry. 
However, Porter argues that firms can be proactive in creating a more favorable 
industry structure, as some airlines did with such strategies as the hub and spoke 
system, investments in reservations systems, and frequent flyer programs. The hub 
and spoke system, for example, simultaneously reduced costs, facilitating lower 
airfares, and created an advantage for the airlines that were first to obtain the limited 
gate space at critical airports. Porter argues that there may be one low-cost leader, but 
many firms should differentiate themselves and/or focus on the needs of niche 
segments.  
Complementary to the strategic positioning school is the resource-based view of the 
firm, which focuses on the way a firm uses resources to gain sustainable competitive 
advantage. Barney (1991, p. 99) contends that “a firm is said to have competitive 
advantage when it is implementing a value-creating strategy not simultaneously being 
implemented by any current or potential competitors.” The resource-based perspective 
suggests that unique resources and capabilities represent the main determinants of 
corporate performance relative to rival firms (Penrose, 1959). Competencies and 
capabilities lead to sustained superior returns, to the extent that they are firm specific 
(i.e., imperfectly mobile), valuable to customers, non-substitutable, and difficult to 
imitate (Rugman & Verbeke, 2002).  
How, then, might a cinema operator develop a set of resources which would add value 
for audiences but be difficult to imitate? How might a theater draw hiving customers 
away from their large DVD collections and home cinemas, when some home screens 
approach the perceived size of multiplex screens? How might a theater counter the 
collapse in release windows by studios, which in the 1960s spanned seven years 
between box office and television broadcast, and today is virtually simultaneous 
between box office and DVD release?  
The first requirement for many movie theaters may be to re-address and re-identify 
the issue of what market they are in, exactly. One of the most influential marketing 
articles ever written, Marketing Myopia by Theodore Levitt (1960), put forth the 
argument that most organizations are constricted by too narrow a vision of what 
business they are in; or, in other words, by limited business horizons. As a result of 
this visionary article, the oil companies redefined their business as energy rather than 
just petroleum, while US passenger railroads were too slow to redefine their horizons. 
Industries with limited scopes can still be found today, however. We would argue that 
the US cinema industry is included amongst this group, having been too slow to 
widely embrace new strategies required to respond to industry and technology 
convergence. This convergence necessitates that the cinema industry redefine its 
competition and broaden its horizons in order to develop effective strategies. As 
stated by Levitt (1986, p. xxii): “The future belongs to people who see possibilities 
before they become obvious.”  
What possibilities exist for the cinema industry that might offer an escape from the 
trap of technology/industry convergence? For some theaters, recent technological 
innovations may represent the key to success.  
5. Sustainable competitive advantage from new technologies 
In the past few years, some new technologies have become potentially available to the 
movie theater industry, although they have not yet been widely adopted. Two of these 
technologies were developed by the Canadian IMAX Corporation. In order to 
understand their potential, it may be useful to review the impact of other projection 
technologies developed in the past half century.  
5.1. Lessons learned from Cinerama 
In 1952, when television first threatened the movie industry, an innovative wide-
screen format called Cinerama premiered and became an overnight sensation. As 
described by Fortune magazine, the new, three-dimensional motion picture created a 
remarkable illusion of reality (“Cinerama,” 1953). Filming in Cinerama involved the 
use of three cameras, each of which shot the same scene from a different angle. In 
theaters that were retro-fitted to show Cinerama, three separate projectors cast these 
film images onto three screens which were adjoined to create one giant, curved screen 
that wrapped around the audience. By design, this format enveloped audience 
members and created an almost 3-D like illusion that they were actually in the film.  
Ultimately, the format failed because epic-scale Cinerama movies were too expensive 
to produce using the three camera process. Moreover, Cinerama theaters were also too 
expensive to equip; consequently, not enough movie houses existed to show the 
Cinerama films, and thus prevented diffusion of the technology. Despite cost barriers 
and limited distribution capabilities, Cinerama succeeded for a decade, propelled by a 
series of box office hits shown in a format against which television simply could not 
compete (Sackett, 1990). Cinerama’s key point of differentiation was that the curved 
screen virtually surrounded the audience, occupying their entire field of vision and 
creating the perception that they were actually participating in the movie. This added 
a dimension to the theater experience that provided a competitive advantage, one 
which could not be replicated by either television or standard 35 mm cinemas.  
5.2. CinemaScope 
Following the demise of Cinerama, the movie industry settled for a more modest, cost 
effective wide-screen format known as CinemaScope. Introduced by 20th Century 
Fox in 1953, CinemaScope was designed with the intention of clearly differentiating 
the cinema experience from the small screen. Although the format still provided 
audiences with an experience they couldn’t get at home from watching television, 
CinemaScope lacked the WOW impact imparted via Cinerama’s much larger and 
curved viewing screens. Imitated by such formats as Vista-Vision, Panavision, and 
Todd A0, CinemaScope not only survived and thrived, but quickly became the 
industry standard.  
6. The IMAX option for sustainable competitive advantage 
As a technological phenomenon, Cinerama offered great promise due to the sensory 
experience it provided consumers. Unfortunately, its fatal weakness lay in the costs 
involved. For some theaters, one potential solution to the current crisis facing the 
exhibitor sector involves technology that is similar to Cinerama. Ironically, this 
saving grace comes from a company that only a few years ago was teetering on the 
verge of bankruptcy, but experienced its best year ever in 2005 with a 35% increase in 
revenues; during the same period, cinemas world wide experienced a sharp drop in 
earnings and the US box office was down 6% (“IMAX,” 2005). So, what is the secret 
of IMAX’s success, with only 280 IMAX theaters operating in 40 countries? In short, 
it offers a similar experience to Cinerama, but with only a three year payback. 
6.1. IMAX revolutionizes the theater experience and cannot be 
replicated at home 
Screens in IMAX theaters are as large as eight stories tall and one hundred or more 
feet wide. Unlike Cinerama, the IMAX system offers movie theaters the opportunity, 
at an affordable level of investment, to transform movies into events with guaranteed 
WOW impact when shown in IMAX format. This can create a sustainable 
competitive advantage by clearly differentiating the cinema from in-home product 
substitutes like large screen television formats, with an in-theater experience that 
simply cannot be replicated as home entertainment. Unlike standard multiplex 
screens, and reminiscent of Cinerama, IMAX screens are so large that they extend to 
the edge of a viewer’s peripheral vision. When that image is combined with the in-
theater sound system, it creates an immersive experience and, as with Cinerama, 
IMAX audiences feel as if they are part of the on-screen action, in a way that is more 
intense and exciting than anything offered via traditional multiplex screens.  
6.2. IMAX offers affordable conversion costs 
The foundation of the IMAX Corporation was built upon the production and 
distribution of IMAX documentaries. Later, however, the company realized that the 
commercial market (i.e., multiplexes exhibiting Hollywood films) held significantly 
larger commercial potential to diffuse the product. To increase demand, the IMAX 
Corporation developed a technology that allows standard 35 mm movies to be 
digitally converted into the giant IMAX 15/70 format (called DMR or Digital Re-
Mastering technology) at a modest incremental cost. Conversion of a 35 mm live-
action film into the IMAX format costs roughly $2–$3 million, a sum that seems 
affordable when compared with the typical movie production budget of $100+ 
million, and marketing and distribution costs of $40+ million.  
Additionally, the new MPX projection system enables existing movie theaters to 
convert to IMAX at a cost that is much lower than that of traditional IMAX projection 
technology. As such, the value proposition for movie theaters to convert to IMAX has 
changed, via reduced switching costs and a shortened payback period of three years. 
The average cost of converting to IMAX has dropped from $8 million per theater, five 
years ago, to just $1.6 million today. The latter sum can be broken down into line item 
costs of $1.3 million to purchase the IMAX system itself and $300,000 for 
construction to retro-fit a cinema.  
Despite affordability, it is not suggested here that the IMAX MPX system is a viable 
proposition for every movie theater. A significant number of existing theaters have, 
however, been built on a larger scale, and these auditoriums would be easy to retro-fit. 
Some smaller theaters in multiplexes, especially those which are reserved for end-
cycle films and are utilized less often, might also prove worthy candidates for re-
design. The opportunity cost of conversion, combined with a three year payback, may 
make these smaller theaters viable contenders for renovation.  
6.3. Movies converted to IMAX earn more money 
Warner Brothers was the first major studio to float an IMAX release of a feature film; 
in this case, The Matrix Reloaded. Sales results showed that IMAX theaters, which 
accounted for only 7% of all North American screens showing the movie, produced 
27% of the box office earnings (Marich, 2005). More astonishingly, the IMAX launch 
occurred four weeks after The Matrix Reloaded opened in wide release across North 
America, meaning most hard core fans had already seen the movie in traditional 
theater format. The same pattern has been repeated over and over again with Star 
Wars, Batman Begins, Charlie and the Chocolate Factory, Harry Potter, and other 
big Hollywood movies, including Polar Express.  
Polar Express produced 28% of its total box office from IMAX theaters, which 
represented only 0.8% of all screens across North America. According to Cherney 
(2006), “Polar Express was first released in 2004, on 80 IMAX screens and took in 
$45 million, compared with another $115 million that the children’s-orientated movie 
attracted on 8000 conventional screens.” “The 3-D version (Polar Express) set a 
record for IMAX, pulling in an average $35,600 per screen — roughly six times as 
much as conventional theaters” (Tsiantar, 2004). The movie finished the year as the 
ninth highest grossing film; however, without the IMAX release, it would not have 
appeared in the top ten list (C. Cramer, personal communication, December 22, 
2005).  
Market research has also shown that repeat visitations occur at a higher rate for IMAX 
screens than traditional multiplexes, which indicates the IMAX experience has a 
powerful effect on audiences. As related by Diorio (2005), “84% of the IMAX-
version of The Matrix Reloaded patrons had previously attended a showing of the pic 
in a conventional venue.” In standard 35 mm theaters, even the biggest blockbusters 
rarely produce that level of repeat visitation (Table 2).  
Table 2.  
Polar Express: 2004 release in 35 mm theaters vs. IMAX 2005 release  
Week # Week date Weekly gross Theater count Theater average 
35 mm theaters 
1 All theaters Nov. 12, 2004 $28,489,498 3650 $7805 
2 All theaters Nov. 19, 2004 $26,295,383 3650 $7204 
3 All theaters Nov. 26, 2004 $23,259,205 3650 $6372 
4 All theaters Dec. 3, 2004 $14,888,628 3650 $4079 
5 All theaters Dec. 10, 2004 $14,780,804 3257 $4538 
6 All theaters Dec. 17, 2004 $18,686,785 2702 $6916 
 
IMAX only 
1 IMAX theaters Nov. 25, 2005 $1,497,361 66 $22,687 
2 IMAX theaters Dec. 2, 2005 $1,215,007 66 $18,409 
Week # Week date Weekly gross Theater count Theater average 
3 IMAX theaters Dec. 9, 2005 $1,445,283 66 $21,898 
4 IMAX theaters Dec. 16, 2005 $2,292,494 66 $34,735 
5 IMAX theaters Dec. 23, 2005 $2,445,713 66 $37,056 
6 IMAX theaters Dec. 30, 2005 $1,109,908 66 $16,817 
Sources: http://www.boxofficemojo.com (Retrieved January 13, 2006); G. Paddison, 
G. Foster, and C. Cramer, personal communications — December, 2005 (see Table 
3). 
6.4. IMAX movies can command premium ticket prices 
An IMAX release is lucrative for movie theaters, in that the format commands 
premium ticket prices 30%–40% over and above standard ticket prices. For example, 
if admission to a standard release 35 mm movie shown in a normal multiplex is priced 
at $8.00, IMAX can easily charge $12.00 admission for the same film. In India, 
China, and Korea, audiences pay up to four times the 35 mm admission price for 
IMAX presentations, which are so popular in those countries that show times often 
begin as early as 7 a.m. (C. Cramer, personal communication, December 22, 2005)! 
This is because the IMAX format has significant brand equity. With the possible 
exceptions of Disney and Pixar, movie-goers do not flock to films because of the 
studio brand name. Research shows, however, that audiences do get excited about 
seeing a movie release in the IMAX format.  
Interviews with IMAX executives (see Table 3) revealed that the company has 
conducted experiments regarding elasticity of demand. Carried out in 14 IMAX-
owned theaters across North America, one study was designed as such: while rival 
theater chains showing the same movie were charging $9.00 admission price for a 
standard 35 mm release, IMAX modified its ticket prices on a daily basis from the 
first day of release and found that at $10.00 market entry, the movie was sold-out. 
Raising the price to $11.00 on day two, $12.00 on day three, and even $13.00 on day 
four, the movie still attracted audiences sufficiently to rate the IMAX release a 
success. Customer satisfaction surveys showed that audiences either liked or loved the 
movie in that $10.00–$13.00 ticket range (G. Foster, personal communication, 
December 7, 2005).  
Table 3.  
Personal communications: Interviews included in this article  
The personal communications cited within this article represent interviews conducted by one of 
the authors, John McDonnell, with: 
• Cheryl Cramer — Director, Investor Relations, IMAX Corporation (interview conducted December 
22, 2005) 
 
• Greg Foster — President, IMAX Film Entertainment (interview conducted December 7, 2005) 
 
• Gordon Paddison — Executive Vice President of Integrated Marketing, New Line Cinema (interview 
conducted December 8, 2005) 
6.5. IMAX can help transform release strategies 
In the early days of silent films, distributors earned more money by issuing multiple 
prints of films in a wide release. This practice changed because some exhibitors were 
willing to pay distributors more to secure an exclusive “window” to show new movies 
featuring popular stars. Since then, the business has been governed by the concept of 
staggered release of new movies. During the Studio Era (1930–1948), movies were 
exclusively distributed as a “roadshow” release to first-run theaters, the largest and 
most profitable movie houses strategically located in city centers. Many were the 
grand old movie palaces seating 2000–4000 patrons in one session. Luxurious 
amenities and five-star service were provided to differentiate the first-run roadshow 
experience, and premium ticket prices were charged. After playing out the first-run 
venues, movies were released sequentially over time to second-, third-, fourth-, and 
even fifth-run theaters as they gradually diffused from cities into the suburbs and the 
country. During this time frame, distributor releases were narrow and controlled.  
Today, while movie releases follow the same basic first-, second-, and third-run 
pattern, the technology that represents each has replaced cinema classes. Moreover, 
the terminology has changed somewhat; runs are now called “windows.” Theatrical 
release is now the first window that establishes the movie as a brand. Premium pay 
TV now represents the second window, followed by release in the home video market 
as the third window, pay TV as the fourth window, and free-to-air television as the 
fifth window.  
The introduction of the multiplex was initially expected to provide more screen time 
availability to independent films, but the major studios’ adoption of the blockbuster 
movie strategy (accompanied by enormous marketing budgets and saturation 
advertising) resulted in film distributors abandoning narrow releases, except for low-
budget films. Major studio blockbusters are launched with increasingly wider 
releases; for example, prints of the last Harry Potter film went into 4000 theaters and 
played on almost 8000 screens. Theaters would rather play a hit movie on 2–3 screens 
in their multiplex to attract more admissions and make more money at the concession 
stand, and the studios need to quickly attract the widest audience possible to recoup 
earnings on massive production budgets and marketing expenditures. IMAX theaters 
have greater seating capacity and, therefore, faster earning capacity than many 
existing multiplex auditoriums. Further, there is simply no comparison when it comes 
down to product differentiation based on the size of the cinema screen. In sum, not 
only can IMAX seat considerably more people, but patrons are willing to spend extra 
to experience a movie on an IMAX screen.  
Consequently, Regal and AMC, two of the largest US theater chains, have begun 
converting some of their auditoriums into IMAX MPX theaters. It has been shown 
that big budget Hollywood movies exhibited in IMAX theaters outperform (in terms 
of gross box office, attendance, and per screen earnings) the same movie shown in a 
standard multiplex (see Table 2). If IMAX screens were widely diffused in the 
exhibitor sector, an opportunity would arise for the major studios to revert back to 
narrower releases and save money on the launch of big movies through reduced print 
costs. In December 2006, Paramount released Dreamgirls as an exclusive one week 
roadshow in three theaters in Los Angeles, San Francisco, and New York, prior to 
wider general release. This was the first time in many years that this strategy had been 
used, and could herald a return to exclusive engagements for some major motion 
pictures which, as IMAX movies, would be likely to have greater impact on audiences 
and facilitate positive word of mouth early on.  
6.6. Attracting novel niche markets 
Another strategy for cinemas that do not convert to IMAX, which many should 
pursue, could be facilitated by IMAX technology. Most movie theaters have made 
little or no attempt to attract non-traditional audiences at non-peak times. IMAX 
conversion of some theaters could potentially enable big blockbusters to be 
programmed onto fewer, but larger capacity, IMAX screens. This would, in turn, free 
up smaller, non-IMAX screens for other purposes. Replacement programming might 
vary from independent films that attract niche segments, to new revenue streams from 
entertainment events, social events, or group functions. Were cinemas to invest in 
digital projection for these smaller theaters, they could offer consumers viewing of 
live concerts or major sporting events, provide a venue in which medical students 
could watch live video feeds of surgical procedures, or perhaps host a business 
convention. Marketing to many of these segments would also be easier if more 
theaters offered relaxed seating, food, and alcoholic beverages. Admission to these 
VIP cinemas could easily be priced higher than standard multiplex tickets, and food 
and beverage profits could bring in a tidy sum. Of special significance, these types of 
settings are popular with older audiences, a consumer segment of increasing 
importance (Maddox, 2005).  
Alternatively, larger retro-fitted IMAX theaters could also show live sporting events. 
Imagine watching the Daytona 500 in this environment, cars screaming past audience 
members on a viewing screen eight stories tall and 100 feet wide, sound effects 
reverberating via a 12,000 watt digital sound system. This would create an immersive 
experience for NASCAR fans who cannot attend the track.  
6.7. Does IMAX fit the theory for value adding and inimitability? 
We earlier posed the question: How, then, might a cinema operator develop a set of 
resources which would add value for audiences but be difficult to imitate? A model by 
Fahy and Smithee (1999) provides a framework that cinema operators might use to 
evaluate options. The researchers note that value to customers is an essential element 
of competitive advantage. For example, an IMAX theater offers an immersive 
experience that cannot be repeated in the home. The price experiment by IMAX 
demonstrated that IMAX consumers were more than willing to pay a price premium 
over the standard multiplex. Other central elements of the resource-based value 
(RBV) framework involve the inability of competitors to duplicate resource 
endowments and appropriability.  
Barriers to duplication exist if the resource is inimitable, immobile, or non-
substitutable. It is more difficult to imitate a resource if, for example, there are 
interconnected assets or assets that must be used in connection with one another. In 
the case of an IMAX cinema, the MPX projection system must be used with a larger 
stadium-style theater and a 12,000 watt sound system. In addition, a competitive 
advantage which cannot be imitated results from property rights and the granting of 
an operating license. These operating licenses bestow upon the owner territorial 
exclusivity, which means that another IMAX operator cannot enter an established 
zone, the size of which varies according to location, but is based on travel time by 
consumers. These licenses limit the mobility of a resource. There is also no similar 
technology to the MPX projection system that could be substituted.  
Appropriation of value, once derived, becomes a particular problem where property 
rights are not clearly defined. Again, in the case of an IMAX MPX projection system, 
property rights are clearly defined. Hunt and Morgan (1995) considered the 
characteristics of resources that affect the sustainability of an advantage, including 
interconnectedness and immobility, discussed above.  
7. Coming attractions 
A lesson from both schools of strategic thought is that all firms within an industry 
should not adopt the same strategy. Porter argues against imitation in strategy, while 
RBV advocates note that different resource assortments suggest targeting different 
market segments and/or competing against different competitors (Hunt & Morgan, 
1995). Clearly, IMAX is not a panacea for the movie theater industry, but it represents 
a viable strategy for some theater operators to combine resources in a unique way in 
order to differentiate themselves.  
One insight provided by the RBV approach is that operators must identify a durable 
source of value for consumers. Providing a giant screen and an immersive big sound 
experience that cannot be reproduced in the home is one way of doing this.  
Cinema-goers are diverse, and this should be reflected in the strategies adopted by the 
industry. Yet, the investment explosion of the past decade in US cinemas has 
produced thousands of multiplex theaters, most of which are remarkably similar. 
History demonstrates that a fatal strategic mistake is to not define competition broadly 
enough; in this case, home entertainment systems and not just other cinemas. For 
those consumers who have a home entertainment system, the cinema must offer an 
experience that the home system cannot replicate. Finally, most movie theaters have 
made little or no attempt to attract non-traditional audiences at non-peak times. 
Digital projection will enable exhibition of live concerts or major sporting events, and 
could provide a venue for business, social, cultural, or religious organizations.  
The movie theater industry can survive — if it can shrug off the straitjacket of the 
standard multiplex experience by embracing new technologies and more diverse 
target markets. With product substitutes siphoning off movie audiences and aging 
baby boomers entering retirement, however, the biggest threat to theaters may be 
marketing myopia. Theater operators should be asking the classic question: What 
business are we in?  
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